Building a sturdy ontology

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1. On First Cause
2. First steps: The General Principle of Equivalence
3. Building a sturdy ontology.
4. The cataclysm that attends the General Principle of Equivalence
5. On the structure available to possible worlds.
6. Boundary conditions of the world - the Cartesian view.
7. On denoting and the laws of thought.
8. Something for nothing, and why this is not absurd.

3. Building a sturdy ontology.

The subject of this post is to set out a basic ontology (see below for explanation of this term) as a metaphysical system that is capable of dealing with the concepts and constructions that develop under the action of the General Principle of Equivalence

WHAT IS ONTOLOGY?

Ontology is a spooky word and philosophers use and abuse it in many ways. Ontology can be seen as having four parts (Hofweber 2005):
(O1) the study of ontological commitment, i.e. what we or others are committed to,
(O2) the study of what there is,
(O3) the study of the most general features of what there is, and how the things there are relate to each other in the metaphysically most general ways,
(O4) the study of meta-ontology, i.e. saying what task the discipline of ontology should aim to accomplish, how the question it aims to answer should be understood, and with what methodology they can be answered.
According to Hofweber:
(O4) will have to say how the other three are supposed to be understood. If (O1) has the result that the beliefs we share commit us to a certain kind of entity then this requires us either to accept an answer to a question about what there is in the sense of (O2) or to revise our beliefs. If we accept that there is such an entity in (O2) then this invites questions in (O3) about its nature and the general relations it has to other things we also accept.


ONTOLOGY: THE VIEW OF THE CARTESIAN MEDITATOR

Let's look at the view of the Cartesian Meditator (one who accepts only that which is transcendent of doubt - see my post on the General Principle of Equivalence and Broughton's interpretation of this) as it relates to O1 to O4.
A NOTE FOR HARDCORE PHILOSOPHERS (to be ignored by everyone else): First recall that the Meditator I adopt here is the Meditator who sticks rigorously to Descartes' Method of Doubt as interpreted by Broughton (2002), but not the one that later drops this method for a softer view of a non-deceiving God. To complicated and long winded to talk about that here.

On O1: The Cartesian Meditator commits only to that which is indefeasible - meaning that which cannot be doubted. But this means directly that if there is something which is transcendent of doubt, one is obliged to accept it. One cannot say 'Oh that's all very good, but here is a counterexample' unless one can show that the counterexample is transcendent of doubt. If this were properly shown then my thesis fails, but there can't be two truths that disagree in reality, so I feel quite safe as Cartesian Meditator.

On O2: Virtually all that presents to the Cartesian Meditator is suspect - an illusion. It can't be trusted because one might be dreaming or tricked by an evil genius (see Descartes work or that of Newman in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ('Descartes Epistemology') for more on this). Two things must be brought into the 'actual' ontology, from the 'possible' ontology (see Fine (1991), and that is the Meditator himself or herself, and the General Principle of Equivalence (seem my posting on this). Actually, everything else is suspect.

On O3: What are the general features of what there is? This concept is to my mind monumentally dangerous. We talk about properties, relations, tropes, space, things and no end of other aspects of what there is or might be. The Cartesian Meditator is very concerned about these. Kant looked at these in detail and showed that all these are essentially concepts manufactured in the mind, any or none of which might be a proper term for what is. No matter what we think of properties and so forth, we have no way of properly supposing that such notions are any proper basis to create a system that relates to the World-as-it-is-in-itself. If this is perfectly obvious to you, you can skip the next few paragraphs.

Swinburne (1995) investigates various kinds of properties, providing notions of hard and soft properties, general relational properties, general properties, particular relational properties, soft past-related properties and other variations, and then enunciates six different versions of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (Leibniz - look up Wikipedia or the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on this if you are interested) relating to these definitions. For example (p. 390): ‘Any two individuals which have all the same general hard and past-related soft properties are the same individual.’ He then explores the implications of adopting each form of the principle. His purpose in doing so is to investigate which individuals might have ‘thisness’.
Armstrong (2005) takes a different tack. Rather than supposing various categories of properties, he compares and contrasts properties from the majority views, asking (p.309)
1. ‘Are properties universals or tropes?’
2. ‘Are properties attributes of particulars or are particulars just bundles of properties?’
3. ‘Are properties categorical (qualitative) in nature, or are they powers?’
4. ‘If a property attaches to a particular, is this predication contingent or is it necessary?’

I will consider Armstrong’s paper in some detail because this thesis provides terms under which these questions may be addressed, using a principle of equivalence. In particular, the question is not whether universals are properties or tropes, or categorical in nature or powers, but how properties, or whatever there is, can form unified structures having complexity any greater than a simple.
Armstrong supports universals rather than tropes. He is prepared to forego the simplicity of tropes, because identities across particulars (that is, universals) seem to be necessary to hold the world together. I will later argue that universals are not imbued with this characteristic, whether property or trope, or anything else.
He asks (p. 311) ‘How do properties stand to the particulars that have the properties?’ and finds that bundle theories have (p. 311) ‘great difficulty with the metaphysics of the uniting principle or principle of bundling,’ but admits that a similar problem applies to the alternative view (which he later addresses). He wonders what might bundle ‘dispositions’. Again he implies that all things may be expected to fall apart, and he infers that this is one of the most confounding metaphysical problems. Later he expresses the view that he likes the idea that every property should bestow power, presumably because this would provide some connection between cause and effect. This would be consistent with his adherence to the Eleatic Principle (Colyvan 2004).
Armstrong explains (p. 317) that
Baxter had wrestled with the problem of the ‘fundamental tie’ that is supposed to hold together particular and universal. It is the great difficulty that is regularly raised against universals. It apparently relates particular and universal, but it seems to be more fundamental than a relation. Philosophers sympathetic to universals have said apparently desperate things such as ‘non-relational’ tie’. Baxter came up with the idea that the particular and its universal actually overlapped, were partially identical. A thing’s properties, the universals it instantiates, go to make up a thing, and the things that a universal is instantiated by go to make up a universal. [my emphasis]
I have quoted this at length, because this is very similar to the solution that will derive in this work. However, to achieve this unity I have to drop the idea of universals, particulars and things. This is a tack that Armstrong warns against, for to remove any universal could have unwanted results. ‘The damage might ripple on further. So beware!’ (Armstrong 2005, p. 318).
I say 'rubbish'. If that is what removing universals does, then so be it. Let's not presume that such a fragile system would be a proper model of the world. The universe has been here since the beginning, so it is a bit stronger than all that.

By adopting the terms omnet and asset as described in The General Principle of Equivalence there is no presupposition about the way the world is, the terms are purely nominal. One might argue that merely referring to an omnet or asset presupposes the existence of such but this is not so. For whether there is just nothing or a singular something or a plural something, which exhausts the possibilities, these are nominally omnets. Similarly for assets, and if each omnet has only itself and is otherwise indivisible then the asset is the omnet. The GPE in this respect is just a global tautology that says what is, is what it is, has what it has.

On O4: This was said to be the study of meta-ontology, i.e. saying what task the discipline of ontology should aim to accomplish, how the question it aims to answer should be understood, and with what methodology they can be answered.
Ontology for this Meditator would ideally be able to answer all physics, mathematics and philosophical questions about the world, at least in principle. This is a big ask, but there are reasons for thinking this should be possible. The principle reason I have to thinking this, is that the GPE will be shown to imply that the only complex structure that can exist, must be constructed in reality as an effect of the condition of the world that the GPE statement mirrors. Pause for a moment and consider what this means. ALL complex structure. Then, if one can properly understand its implications, one can properly model the world, at least in principle. This is why I adopted the constructional ontology as a suitable model. Actually the constructional ontology is just the framework implied to be the right kind by the GPE itself - start with the Meditator and the constructor (GPE) and watch what happens.


HOW THE ONTOLOGY LOOKS TO THE MEDITATOR

Now we have a sturdy ontology. The ontology that the Meditator adopts is very much simplified in its early stages, for there is only a very sparse universe that might be admitted into the ontology, as will shortly be shown. One simply places all that might be into a possible ontology. This is just a construct in which all that might be is quarantined for consideration. No ontological commitment is given to any of what might be other than the meta-ontology itself, which is validated by the method of doubt. Then the only constructs that are carried into the actual ontology are those that are transcendent of doubt, namely the Meditator and the GPE. From there we can test possible omnets (meaning omnets that might have a Cartesian basis in reality) as candidates to enter the actual ontology.

I carry out this test in my upcoming post: The cataclysm that attends the General Principle of Equivalence. Then we get to see what is left in the system.

References:
Armstrong, DM 1978a, Nominalism and realism, vol. 1, Universals and scientific realism, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne.

---- 1978b, A theory of universals, vol. 2, Universals and scientific realism, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne.

---- 2005, 'Four disputes about properties', Synthese, no. 144, pp. 309-20.

Broughton, J 2002, Descartes’s method of doubt, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Fine, K 1991, The Study of Ontology, Noûs, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Jun., 1991), pp. 263-294

Swinburne, R 1995, 'Thisness', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 73 no. 3, pp. 389-400.

On first cause

Page Navigator>>
1. On First Cause
2. First steps: The General Principle of Equivalence
3. Building a sturdy ontology.
4. The cataclysm that attends the General Principle of Equivalence
5. On the structure available to possible worlds.
6. Boundary conditions of the world - the Cartesian view.
7. On denoting and the laws of thought.
8. Something for nothing, and why this is not absurd.

1. Introduction: why is there something rather than nothing?

The first question that should rightly be asked, according to Leibniz, is 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' This is the biggest question, and has been asked since the beginning of scientific and mathematical thought. Even the Ancients asked this question. And, it would seem you too are asking this question and probably getting a heap of unhelpful answers. You will have read various other works on the matter and found one or more of the following proposed answers:

• The non-answer:
  This is not a question that can be answered by humans for we cannot know the world as it is in itself. This is the philosopher's answer, based on Kant's work, and follows from Hume's work; or
  
• The boggle-with-science non-answer:
  The universe began with a vast explosion that generated space and time and created all matter and energy in the universe. Of course, while this may be true, this is not an explanation (don't be fooled) it is only a description. Most of us freeze at the maths involved and so take it on faith. I know this maths - it is cool, but it is still just a tool of description, as is physics. Describing an electron in terms of quantum mechanics for example, is just a description. It says no more than 'an electron has certain properties'. It does not explain why these properties are the way they are. While physics is extremely useful, and likely 'mostly right' this does not make the above an explanation, so it is not an answer.
  
• The shifting the answer one more step away non-answer:
  This is also included in the physics answers: that observed phenomena are 'explained' by forces of nature, and these are explained by something (say quantum mechanics or relativity), that are explained by something (say string theory) ... a potentially infinite regress. One might include recourse to God under this bullet point because God is something, so one might ask why is there a God and not just nothing. I am not making any claims for or against God here. You will have to make that call after I have explained first cause to you and you properly understand it. There are many other shifting methods available, from spiritual concepts to claims that the world is implied by the Laws of Thought (ie logic). But one must first show why the Laws of Thought exist, even as conditions of the world (I'll touch on these elsewhere, or you can look it up in Wikipedia or some other source).
  

In contrast, I can give you the answers, proven beyond Cartesian doubt (the most stringent of skeptical positions that one can have). But before you proceed, I want you to understand that gaining this knowledge comes with a price:

• You will have to think deeply about the world, and come to a higher, more skeptical level of understanding about the way the world actually is, and your perspective of it, and your position in it.
  
• You must promise yourself not to shy away from unexpected or unwanted conclusions. You are now bound by 'skeptical commitment', which is that if you have found a proposition that can only be true, you cannot simply bat it away because some less well-founded, but appealing concept presents (such as the world as it appears to be to us).
• In compensation, I can say that the end view is a more beautiful world than the world you presently inhabit, because you will see it with a better perspective, as an expression of a simple, necessarily existent condition: a principle of equivalence. This is the most mature world view, and manifests as a sudden recognition of the beauty of nature and occasional epiphany such as why the numbers we find exemplified in the physical universe happen to be as they are (say 'e') and not some other number.
  

The second biggest question is 'Given that there is something, why is it the way it is and not some other way?' The answer to the second question is in some ways more amazing than the first. The answer to both can be traced to the same root. That is, if there is a truly first cause then all things must find their origin in it. That is, the world and all its well-founded descriptions - physics, mathematics, philosophy - all must show how they justify a place in our thinking by showing that they follow as an implication or expression of first cause.

There may be many questions that immediately come to mind. Here are some:

1. How can there be a first cause? Doesn't it require that it have a cause? Doesn't the idea come as an infinite regress? Didn't Kant and Hume, and bunch of other people say this can't be done?
   
2. If there is a first cause, how can I know that it, and not some other, is the first cause?
3. Isn't this promising something for nothing?
4. What about God? Isn't he first cause?

There are probably many other questions. I cannot answer all at once. Rather, I want to show you first cause and why it is first cause and why the proposition that I use to model it is a justified truth worthy of belief (I provide the justified truth, the belief is not my prerogative). Then the first two questions just go away. The third question is an odd one to ask. Given that both are just terms that refer to some possible state of affairs, why should one find a possible transition from nothing to something (or the reverse) any more odious than a transition from one state of something (the universe, say) to another state of something. Both are states of being. But this is a deep matter to which I will return when the ground has been plowed.

As for God, well. If there is a God, he instructs me to live by the truth, for otherwise I am living a falsehood. If I find an absolute truth (ie can't be false) and that leads me to find that there is a God, well and good. If the same reasoning shows there is no God, then God must step aside for fear of breaking his own rules about truth.

The world in a nutshell.

Eugene Wigner (1960), one of the twentieth centuries smartest mathematical physicists asked

How do we know that, if we made a theory which focuses its attention on phenomena we disregard and disregards some of the phenomena now commanding our attention, that we could not build another theory which has little in common with the present one but which, nevertheless, explains just as many phenomena as the present theory?

How would one know which phenomena should receive preference? Does any phenomenon deserve priority of importance over any other? Simply, no. In the phenomena of everyday experience there is no hint of the subtle results that forced a radical rethink of our scientific theories that led to Special and General Relativity, and Quantum Mechanics. So if we are not justified to elevate any particular phenomenon, how can we conceive of any phenomenon as a preferred place to start. In particular, all physical phenomena are subject to doubt, for we cannot exactly measure them, neither can we be sure that we are not mistaken. Consider the work of Descartes if you doubt me here, for I will be building my case from his method of doubt. If you are prepared to trust my word on what he said, then we can proceed.

Loosely speaking, I will show that there are two things about which one can be absolutely certain: that one exists, and that what is, has what it has. These may seem fairly obvious, but I aim to show that these are concepts (properly formalized) that are transcendent of doubt. Removing the possibility to rationally doubt these concepts has several very serious consequences to the implications of these propositions. The first provides us with a place to stand and consider the world. The second, though seemingly no more than a global tautology (a proposition like 'A bachelor is an unmarried man') but this global tautology implies directly that there is a condition of the world that applies for all worlds, and also implies that all possible worlds have a unique origin. This origin is a 'thing' that has unknowable and irrelevant properties beyond having abstract identity and an abstract boundary (explained later).

I will then show that this first state is not stable because the boundary itself has a boundary (just as every meaning has a limit of meaning), but iteratively. First there is one boundary, then two, then three, and so forth. As the boundaries evolve, so too the interactions between them, all based on the principle that brought them to be in the first place (the General Principle of Equivalence). Taken together this implies the generation of structure. The structure exhibits many of the important mathematical characteristics we find in the universe, such as 0, 1, i, e, and Pi. We will also find that the structure is pervaded with an inherent uncertainty that cuts off irrational numbers, but retains a complete system with no gaps between points. This concept I have not seen anywhere else, I had difficulty understanding it myself when first it arose. I have studied this kind of structure through my post-graduate years. If you are a mathematician, physicist or philosopher, you might find this quite entertaining.

I will then show that there are many different perspectives that may be brought upon this system, all of which are equivalent under the General Principle of Equivalence (which is the final arbiter). This means that the system has interpretations in 1, 2, and higher spacetime dimensions (and possibly other kinds of dimensions that are not included for the present). In the 3space-1time interpretation early indications are that this is the right kind of conditions for life, for the structure contains structures that are closely associated with our beloved quantum physics.

The fundamental purpose of this blog is to elicit support for this world-view. I believe with just a little more work, all the bothers associated with quantum mechanics and our empiricist limitations simply fall away.

Now you are ready to consider the next step. Click on 'The General Principle of Equivalence'.